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Abstract
It has been suggested that adversarial examples
cause deep learning models to make incorrect
predictions with high confidence. In this work,
we take the opposite stance: an overly confi-
dent model is more likely to be vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples. This work is one of the most
proactive approaches taken to date, as we link ro-
bustness with non-calibrated model confidence
on noisy images, providing a data-augmentation-
free path forward. The adversarial examples phe-
nomenon is most easily explained by the trend of
increasing non-regularized model capacity, while
the diversity and number of samples in common
datasets has remained flat. Test accuracy has in-
correctly been associated with true generalization
performance, ignoring that training and test splits
are often extremely similar in terms of the overall
representation space. The transferability prop-
erty of adversarial examples was previously used
as evidence against overfitting arguments, a per-
ceived random effect, but overfitting is not always
random.
1. Introduction
Practically obtainable datasets are inherently sparse in high-
dimensions. This is true for image classification tasks like
the CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets, on which deep neural
networks have achieved very low test error. The adversarial
examples phenomenon was an observation that these same
state-of-the-art deep learning models are easily fooled by
images that are objectively very similar to the naturally oc-
curring data on which they were trained (Szegedy et al.,
2014). The effect implies two seemingly contradictory
statements, which Jo & Bengio (2017) and Dube (2018)
summarize well: on one hand, deep neural networks gener-
alize extremely well to a held-out test set, yet any randomly
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selected correctly classified image is arbitrarily close to a
misclassified one.
Several hypotheses have been proposed regarding this phe-
nomenon, such as the idea that adversarial examples occupy
small low-probability “pockets” in the manifold, yet are
dense, similar to rational numbers on the real line (Szegedy
et al., 2014). However, it would be unusual that neural
networks are learning a decision boundary anything like
the distribution of rational and irrational numbers on the
number line. Furthermore, an effect where images initial-
ized with random noise are classified with very high con-
fidence (Nguyen et al., 2015) suggests that there exists at
least one class of “non-examples” that do not occur in low-
probability pockets, but can be found almost everywhere in
the representation space not spanned by the sparse training
data.
The linearity hypothesis of Goodfellow et al. (2015) sug-
gests that for a model parameterized by weights w with
an average magnitude of m, and input x ∈ Rn, one need
only perturb x by a vector of small constants  aligned in
the direction of w to induce a swing in activation of mn.
They argue that  shrinks with increasing n; however Tanay
& Griffin (2016) remind us that the magnitude of the acti-
vations also grows linearly with n. They demonstrate that
linear behaviour alone is insufficient to cause adversarial
examples, and our experiments confirm this.
Non-examples occupy space within the representation abil-
ity of our models that has yet to be explored. In high di-
mensions, these areas will never be explored, therefore it
is logical to attempt to use strong regularization to reduce
representation ability such that we minimize the space away
from the training data sub-manifolds.
We show that not all methods of minimizing the unexplored
space are equivalent. Experiments on the synthetic spheres
dataset from Gilmer et al. (2018) suggests that using low-
precision representations appears to confer additional pose-
invariance characteristics upon a model, with the added
benefit of compression and easing model deployment on
general purpose hardware. In this regard, we expand on the
work of Galloway et al. (2018) that compared the robustness
of full-precision and binarized models, finding that the lower
precision variant was equally or more robust to a variety of
attacks.
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One of our main contributions is a comparison of regular-
ization effects of arbitrarily low-precision internal represen-
tations against traditional methods of regularizing a model,
such as weight decay. We then explore a fundamental trade-
off between preserving sensitivity to valid natural image
classes, and reducing total unexplored space. To the best of
our knowledge, we are also the first to defend against fool-
ing images (Nguyen et al., 2015), also known as “rubbish
class” examples, without using RBF networks which do not
generalize well (Goodfellow et al., 2015).
2. Background
Regularization was investigated as a potential solution to
the adversarial problem as early as in Szegedy et al. (2014),
but was discarded in subsequent work (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) after modest amounts ofL1 weight decay did not com-
pletely resolve the problem. We additionally suspect the
transferability property: that adversarial examples generated
on one architecture (e.g. ResNets) are likely to be misclassi-
fied by others trained independently (e.g. VGG, Inception),
was seen as evidence against overfitting. As overfitting is
traditionally viewed as a random effect that leads to poor
generalization on the test set, researchers falsely concluded
that adversarial examples and overfitting are unrelated. We
maintain that training over-parameterized models on the
same datasets, using the same optimization procedure, is
sufficient to cause non-random overfitting.
Additional work similar to regularization includes Fawzi
et al. (2015), who found that training on random noise also
was not beneficial. Eventually, the suggestions of Szegedy
et al. (2014) were implemented by Cisse et al. (2017), in
which the Lipschitz constant of various layers is constrained
to be ≤ 1. The idea was to prevent instabilities from prop-
agating through the network, but in practice resulted in
modest gains beyond those conferred by adversarial training
data-augmentation approaches. Additionally, Cisse et al.
(2017) did not conduct an in-depth analysis against tradi-
tional regularization techniques like weight decay, beyond
mentioning that they used some weight decay in their exper-
iments. As we show, the “state-of-the-art” architectures they
used are very fragile to strong weight decay, which likely
discouraged them and others from exploring this further.
Gu & Rigazio (2015) proposed using “deep contractive
networks”, which they argued makes the model more flat
near the training data by introducing a smoothness penalty
inspired by a contractive autoencoder (CAE). The main idea
was that making the model’s decision boundary more flat
near the training data manifold should maximize the L2
distortion required to cause misclassification. They also
noticed that denoising autoencoders are able to recover 90%
of adversarial errors by reconstructing examples as a pre-
processing step. Nonetheless, when they attempted to stack
the autoencoder with a (poorly regularized) classifier, the
overall model was easily defeated in an end-to-end attack.
Ultimately, while we do agree that smoothness is desirable
near the training data to a limited extent since an n-sphere
maximizes distance to the surface for a fixed volume sub-
manifold, Gu & Rigazio do not address the behaviour of
their model globally, away from the training data. This
likely leaves it vulnerable to the gradient ascent “fooling
images” attack (Nguyen et al., 2015). Additionally, their
results are reported in terms of the L2 input distortion that
causes a 100% misclassification rate, which is difficult to
compare with other literature on neural network defenses.
Bau et al. (2017) propose a framework for automatically
quantifying disentangled representations in deep CNNs by
network dissection. Although they do not explicitly focus on
robustness to adversarial perturbations, their work is com-
plementary to ours in that they observe a significant degree
of variability in the interpretability of different models that
all obtain very similar “generalization” performance on the
test set.
As of ICLR 2018, the only non-certified defense that has
lived up to claims made for a white-box threat model, after
a recent informal investigation by Athalye et al. (2018), is
that of Madry et al. (2018). Although the work of Athalye
et al. (2018) has not yet undergone official peer review, we
believe their methodology to be sound and in keeping with
techniques that defeated similar previously published de-
fenses with gradient masking tendencies (Papernot et al.,
2015; Gu & Rigazio, 2015). Many of the defeated ICLR
2018 defenses showed signs of gradient masking, or tested
on attacks that were too weak (Dhillon et al., 2018; Buck-
man et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018; Samangouei et al., 2018;
Song et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018). Defense strategies that
rely solely on gradient masking do not improve the richness
of features learned, or affect the underlying geometry of the
decision boundary in a meaningful way, which ultimately
determines real-world robustness in the practical black-box
setting. The white-box model, however, is convenient to
study as it is strictly more difficult to defend against than
black-box. Therefore, if a model is robust against the former,
it also is against the latter.
Expectation over Transformation (EOT) is a sampling tech-
nique that overcomes defenses relying on stochasticity by
attacking them end-to-end after averaging gradients over
several (e.g. 10 or more) forward passes, before taking a
backward step. It has been shown to create reliable adversar-
ial examples against a variety of random viewpoint transfor-
mations, such as over changes in scale and rotation in 2 or
3D (Athalye et al., 2017). It is conceivable that variants of
the same attack can be used against even the most creative
defenses, such as Defense-GAN, where the non-trust worthy
input image is first encoded into a latent space, substituted
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with its nearest neighbor, and then classified (Samangouei
et al., 2018). The attack exploits the concurrently demon-
strated notion that adversarial examples can exist directly on
the data manifold, for a synthetic concentric spheres data
set (Gilmer et al., 2018).
It is also highly plausible that non-differentiable input trans-
formations blocking gradient flow can confidently be back-
propagated through using the same straight through gradient
estimator (STE) commonly used to train binarized and low-
precision neural networks to high accuracy (Bengio et al.,
2013; Courbariaux & Bengio, 2016; Zhou et al., 2016). This
is essentially the “Backward Pass Differentiable Approxi-
mation” used to bypass defenses that destroy gradient signal
in Athalye et al. (2018).
3. The Madry et al. (2018) Defense
The Madry et al. (2018) defense uses projected gradient
descent (PGD) (Kurakin et al., 2017) with a random ini-
tialization to defend against perturbations S ⊆ Rd allowed
under the threat model. More formally, it consists of a
min-max optimization game defined by (1). The inner max-
imization consists of adding a random (e.g. uniform) Lp
bounded perturbation δ ∈ S to the input x, and then taking
several steps in the direction of the gradient that maximizes
the training loss J with respect to x. For each step in the
inner maximization loop, the sign of the gradient is usually
scaled by a constant  and accumulated in x. The outer
minimization is a normal update to model parameters θ by
stochastic gradient descent on the loss obtained with this
new batch of adversarial examples.
min
θ
(
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
J(θ, x+ δ, y)
])
(1)
Their particular claim of robustness considers perturbations
up to  = 0.3 and 8/255 under the L∞ norm for the MNIST
and CIFAR-10 data sets respectively. The L∞ norm is a
reasonable choice since it strictly maximizes all preceed-
ing Lp-norms (e.g. L1, L2), which explains why they see
favourable performance against L2 bounded attacks in their
Figure 6, despite never training with an L2 bounded ad-
versary. We can derive an upper limit for an L∞ trained
model in terms of L2 robustness on an n dimensional data
set given that ‖x‖2 ≤
√
n‖x‖∞. This implies a theoretical
upper L2 limit of 8.4 for MNIST, and 443/255 for CIFAR-10.
Interestingly, both MNIST and CIFAR-10 models in Figure
6 of the Madry et al. (2018) paper use roughly 10% of this
theoretical limit, a quantity determined by picking an ac-
curacy level on the L∞ plot and mapping it to  where the
same value occurs on the L2 plot. This could be explained
by the choice of sampling the initial random perturbation
from a uniform distribution, which will only have a few
values that saturate the limits of ±. In any case, the initial
random perturbation has proven to be critically important
for increasing the diversity of examples trained against dur-
ing training, as opposed to the original deterministic fast
gradient method (Goodfellow et al., 2015).
Despite the success of data-augmentation approaches to
date, we share the opinion of Jo & Bengio (2017) regarding
their long-term suitability, as it is hard to guarantee that
a different attack will not be successful against the particular
adversary used during training. Additionally, the choice of
threat model assumed in data-augmentation based defenses
is often arbitrary, and performance has been found to rapidly
decay for perturbations just slightly beyond that seen by the
model in training (Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018).
4. Experiments on the Madry Defense
We believe it is imperative that the community move
away from solely data-augmentation based approaches as
a defense mechanism. For example, the min-max game-
theoretic nature of (1) assumes an attacker is playing the
same game. This is confirmed by our experiments against
the Madry et al. (2018) defense, as we find at least one zero
and first-order “blindspot”, where behaviour is demonstra-
bly worse than un-defended or well regularized model.
4.1. Constant Pixel Intensity Attack
In Figure 1, a gradient-free, or “zero-order”, attack is de-
ployed against the state-of-the-art models provided online
by Madry et al. (2018) that were secured with PGD. The
attack is trivial in nature, and simply involves adding a con-
stant offset (positive or negative) to the image, and then
clipping to the valid pixel range. There are legitimate con-
cerns about this weakness, and many reasons to expect the
background colour to differ in a real world machine vi-
sion application. Humans have no trouble reading digits
or classifying images registered against a clean, uniform
background, even when the difference between the pixel
intensities in the foreground and background is small.
The attack was motivated by an analysis of the learned
convolutional kernels in Madry et al. (2018) (in particular,
Figure 9 in the paper, and the surrounding discussion in
Appendix E), in which they mention that the first layer
implements a learned thresholding filter. All but three of
thirty-two kernels in the first layer of the three-layer CNN
were approximately zero. Among the three kernels that were
not all zeros, each had only one element that was non-zero.
The function of the entire first layer for the PGD trained
model is to scale and threshold. The reason this could
be an optimal strategy against a PGD adversary is that, in
combination with learned biases, perturbations up to max
are forced to the non-linear region of the ReLU activations.
Both of the independently trained “secret” and “public”
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Figure 1. Attacking the state-of-the-art “secret” model from the
black-box (a) MNIST and (b) CIFAR-10 robustness challenges
hosted by Madry et al. (2018)1. The attack consists of adding a
constant scalar value to every pixel, which can be interpreted as
mostly a change in background colour. To better characterize the
two models, we test beyond the limits of their threat model by
including perturbations larger than 0.3. To do so, we disable the
check in their script that verifies the attack data set has  ≤ 0.3
w.r.t to the natural test set, but we still clip all values to the valid
input range.
models converge to this configuration, and their respec-
tive values of the non-zero elements are (1.34, 0.86, 0.60)
and (1.26, 0.80, 0.52). Kernels did have a more distributed
representation in subsequent layers, but the pattern observed
in the first layer was concerning. This is partly why we
find one of the main recommendations made by Madry et al.
(2018) to be problematic, namely that “increasing capacity
improves robustness”, given that their models are choosing
to not use the capacity they already have. Their justification
is that more capacity is required to train with a stronger
adversary such as PGD, but this contradicts earlier, more
intuitive findings in Tanay & Griffin (2016), that a properly
regularized “nearest centroid” classifier is unaffected by ad-
versarial examples. We maintain that extraneous capacity is
actually a liability in terms of robustness.
Although the models are reasonably well-behaved under
their limited threat model, we maintain that increased sensi-
tivity to a DC offset, as shown by the large shift down and to
the left between the cyan filled area with dash-dot border, to
orange area, is clearly undesirable. The right edge of each
filled area plots accuracy when the offset is subtracted from
the original images, while the left edge is when it is added.
4.2. Non-Example Gradient Ascent Attack
Rather than starting with correctly classified inputs and as-
sessing how much accuracy is maintained after perturbing
them by a finite amount, we can instead perform gradient
ascent on random noise until the probability assigned to
1https://github.com/madrylab/mnist_
challenge
https://github.com/madrylab/cifar10_
challenge
(a) Natural
(b) Public
(c) Secret
Figure 2. Non-examples classified with 100% confidence as each
of the MNIST digits 0 through 9 (read from left to right) by the
three models from Github1. (a) is un-protected, while [(b) and (c)]
are defended with 40 iterations of PGD in the inner-loop, up to
max = 0.3 and step size of 0.01. Some digits can almost be
identified, such as a “3”, “4”, and “7” in (b).
(a) Natural
(b) Public
(c) Secret
Figure 3. Non-examples classified with 100% confidence as each
of the CIFAR-10 classes 0 through 9 (read from left to right) by
the three state-of-the-art WideResNet (32 layers, width factor 10)
models from Github1. (a) is unprotected, while [(b) and (c)] are
defended with 10 and 7 steps of PGD training respectively, with
max = 8 and a step size of 2.
a desired target class is maximized. Intuitively, a robust
model should respond in one of two ways: the input could
be classified with low confidence, since it is very distant
from any natural example in the training distribution. Al-
ternatively, if it is to be classified with high confidence, the
noise should be meaningfully transformed into something
that resembles a legitimate example. This is exactly the test
that was performed by Nguyen et al. (2015), which found
that state-of-the-art deep neural networks respond in neither
of these two ways. These models consistently classify un-
recognizable noise images as belonging to a natural object
class with very high confidence (e.g 99.99%).
The attack consists of first sampling a noisy image
N (0, 0.1) ∈ R28×28 for MNIST, and N (0, 0.1) ∈
R32×32×3 for CIFAR-10. A numpy random seed of 0 was
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used, along with 100 steps of gradient ascent on each of the
target classes using a step size of 0.01. All images were
clipped to the valid pixel range of [0, 1] for MNIST and
[0, 255] for CIFAR-10. Identical per image standardiza-
tion is used as in Madry et al. (2018). The second from
right images in Figure 3 [(b) and (c)] corresponding to the
“ship” class have more blue pixels for water near the corners,
which is somewhat encouraging. Overall, the images are not
nearly as convincing as those in subsequent sections where
strong weight decay or low-precision is used.
5. Toy Experiments
Here, we establish intuition with toy problems that offer
significant insight into the phenomenon of adversarial exam-
ples. We attempt to generalize observations made regarding
these experiments to challenge claims made in the litera-
ture. These experiments provide a nice lens for subsequent
discussions regarding higher-dimensional image classifica-
tion problems and manifolds, such as with CIFAR-10 and
ImageNet in subsequent sections.
5.1. Binary Classification
We first study MNIST three vs. seven classification, as it is
a nearly linearly separable problem for which an optimal
expert model is known a priori. By optimal, we mean a
single set of parameters, θ, for a particular model architec-
ture, that are best suited to a particular task, and confer good
robustness. We do not mean that we achieve zero test error,
as this practically guarantees that adversarial examples will
exist (Gilmer et al., 2018). Zero-error implies that models
with fixed capacity are forced to cheat, by memorizing pe-
culiarities or surface statistics in the data that generalize in
a narrow distributional sense (Jo & Bengio, 2017).
5.1.1. THREES VERSUS SEVENS
We wish to emphasize several points in reference to the
weight visualization from Figure 4, and empirical results
from Table 1.
Clean test accuracy was a weak measure of model fitness.
For example, model 4(f), which had the highest test accu-
racy, was also the most vulnerable to attack. Adversarial
training does not always help. In this case, it was desirable
to be completely invariant to certain areas of the input cor-
responding to background pixels. Naive adversarial training
implementations actually interfere with learning this optimal
solution. Additionally, a model that was already well-tuned
hardly benefited from adversarial training (e.g. compare 4(k)
and 4(l)), and several undefended low-precision models with
5–8 bit representations outperformed the augmented full-
precision one 4(l).
Very low-precision representations (e.g. below 4-bits) even-
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
(i) (j) (k) (l)
Figure 4. Depiction of a logistic regression model’s weights for
various levels of quantization after training on an MNIST three
vs. seven binary classification task. Models [(a)–(c)] are 1-bit, (d)
is 2-bit, [(e) and (f)] are 3-bit, [(g), (h), (i), (j)] are 4, 5, 6, and
7-bits respectively, while [(k) and (l)] are 32-bit precision. All
weights were initialized by subtracting the average seven from
the average three, except for in (a) and (b). Models were fine-
tuned for 50k steps by Adam using the sigmoid cross entropy
loss, a batch size of 128, learning rate of 1e-5, and L2 weight
decay with a regularization constant of 5e-2. Models (f) and (l)
were trained with the same hyper-parameters, but on adversarial
examples (Kurakin et al., 2017).
tually become a compromise in terms of accuracy on both
the clean and perturbed test sets, as the number of param-
eters was already very low, and an insightful initialization
scheme and training procedure were already known. Models
with weights that were not given “expert initialization” were
far more sensitive to the choice of hyper-parameters, such as
the standard deviation of the truncated normal distribution
that was used to initialize models trained from scratch. This
suggests that the robustness of much higher capacity models
will be even more sensitive to such hyper-parameters.
Some configurations, such as the pruned binary model 4(a),
fared surprisingly well in light of the learned weight ma-
trices. However, this model is likely more vulnerable to
single pixel or other L0 constrained attacks like the Jaco-
bian Saliency Map Attack (Papernot et al., 2015). We must
be careful when drawing conclusions from only one type of
attack. Here we only reported against the L∞ norm FGSM.
This simple experiment leads to some common sense obser-
vations about robustness, and how it can be obtained through
visualization where possible and benefitting from strong hu-
man judgement when available. Adversarial training or
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Table 1. Accuracy of the logsitic regression models from Figure 4
on test set and adversarial examples generated by fast gradient
(sign) method (Goodfellow et al., 2015) with  = 0.1. Models
were given “expert initialization” except 4(a) and 4(b) which were
initialized from a truncated normal with σ = 0.1.
MODEL BITS TEST FGM NOTE
4(A) 1 95.8 66.7 RAND INIT + PRUNE
4(B) 1 96.7 34.0 RAND INIT
4(C) 1 96.2 55.9 PRUNE
4(D) 2 94.7 52.2
4(E) 3 95.8 73.8
4(F) 3 97.0 18.8 ADV. TRAINING
4(G) 4 95.3 77.3
4(H) 5 95.8 82.8
4(I) 6 95.8 84.1
4(J) 7 95.8 84.5
N/A 8 95.8 84.8
N/A 32 94.8 80.1 NO TRAINING
4(K) 32 95.0 81.1
4(L) 32 96.7 82.3 ADV. TRAINING
data-augmentation is not the only way to confer robustness,
and in fact, it can exacerbate the problem if applied to a
poorly tuned model. We acknowledge that the fast gradient
method is not the only measure of robustness, but it is conve-
nient and exact for the linear model used here. We explore
stronger iterative attacks in subsequent sections. This exper-
iment helps us expand on the observation of Gilmer et al.
(2018) that the capacity required to achieve zero error on a
given dataset is significantly greater than that required to
achieve very low error. In this experiment, driving a model
with fixed architecture and capacity to zero error makes it
brittle, therefore the definition of acceptably low error re-
quires sound human judgement. For this architecture and
dataset combination, we suggest aiming for no less than
≈ 5% error to generalize well.
5.1.2. SPHERES
To gain further insight we reproduce the dataset and two
hidden-layer MLP from Gilmer et al. (2018) in which adver-
sarial examples can be found on the manifold of a synthetic
n-sphere dataset. The task is to classify two n-dimensional
concentric spheres with differing radii. We make the prob-
lem more challenging by training on a semi-sphere and
testing on the full-sphere. We notice the 1-bit weight, 2-
bit activation model retains a tighter shape than the full-
precision equivalent, which begins to sag and expand where
there is a lack of support.
The lack of direct feedback between the real-valued weight
update and the thresholding done in the forward pass could
be seen as a form of inertia. One way to interpret the result
in Figure 5 is that the binary weights vote for the status-quo
and avoid contorting their decision boundary into unusual
shapes in the absence of strong evidence.
(a) (b)
Figure 5. Depiction of decision boundary for MLPs trained on a
variant of the 2-dimensional Spheres dataset from Gilmer et al.
(2018), where we remove two opposing quadrants from the training
set, but test on a full-sphere, a representation of higher-dimensional
data sets that are inherently sparse. The full-precision MLP (a)
flattens out in areas of the manifold that aren’t supported, whereas
the 1-bit weight 2-bit activation MLP (b) retains a full-shape. Oc-
cam’s razor suggests that given a lack of evidence, it is desirable
to preserve the simpler hypothesis (b) of “sphere” than a more
complicated (a) “ellipse”. Best viewed in colour.
6. Non-Example Gradient Ascent Attack
We now show that reducing unexplored space through strong
regularization mostly overcomes this limitation, such that
unrecognizable images are in fact classified with low confi-
dence. Furthermore, when we perform gradient ascent on
an initial noise image, we obtain plausible legitimate images
for each of the respective classes, without using a decoder
or reconstruction objective of any kind.
Obtaining ground-truth calibrated confidence and uncer-
tainty estimates for predictions made by deterministic mod-
els is somewhat of an open problem (Gal, 2016), but for com-
parison purposes we adopt the same procedure as in Nguyen
et al. (2015), where confidence is measured as the magni-
tude of the largest softmax probability. This measure of
confidence is fairly standard in the non-adversarial exam-
ples literature, and various “softmax smoothing” approaches
have been proposed to make these estimates more reliable,
such as temperature scaling (Guo et al., 2017) or penalizing
high entropy distributions (Pereyra et al., 2017). The former
approach is very similar to the defeated defensive distilla-
tion approach that similarly employed softmax temperature
scaling (Papernot et al., 2016), providing a false sense of
security (Carlini & Wagner, 2017).
For both Sections 6.1 and 6.2, we use the following vanilla
three-layer convolutional network described by Table 2
with ReLU activations, and a linear softmax readout layer.
Batch normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) is only used
with low-precision layers to ensure quantization is centered
around zero.
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Table 2. CNN architecture for experiments in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.
Layer H W Cin Cout stride padding
Conv1 8 8 imgch nf 2 SAME
Conv2 6 6 nf 2× nf 1 VALID
Conv3 5 5 2× nf 2× nf 1 VALID
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
(f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Figure 6. Generating MNIST examples with 1-bit (top) and full-
precision (bottom) models after 100 iterations of gradient sign
ascent on each target class with a step size of 1e-2. An L2 reg-
ularization constant of λ = 0.5 was used with the full-precision
model and λ = 0.05 on the first layer of the 1-bit model which
was retained in full-precision. Examples are classified with 45.6%–
78.0% [(b) and (c)] for the 1-bit model, and 35.2%–52.2% [(h) and
(i)].
6.1. Generating MNIST examples
We now attempt to explain why it is possible to gener-
ate such natural images without using a generative model.
It was recently shown that adversarial examples for the
MNIST dataset span an approximately 25 dimensional sub-
manifold, which is mostly shared between models, thus
enabling attack transferability (Trame`r et al., 2017). As
we will see in comparison to ImageNet, this is a compara-
tively modest volume of unexplored example space to be
eliminated. Further, MNIST classes are relatively densely
sampled in the training set with respect to their low dimen-
sionality, therefore strong L2 weight decay is sufficient to
compress the representation space. Interestingly, the bina-
rized models seemed to always yield plausible pen strokes
independent of other hyper-parameter settings, suggesting
they could be a good starting point.
We emphasize that the images in Figure 6 were generated
with an ordinary convolutional neural network, and that
no decoder or reconstruction penalty is used to modify the
normal training procedure in any way. All examples are
classified with significantly less confidence than the unrec-
ognizable fooling images from Nguyen et al. (2015).
6.2. Generating CIFAR-10 examples
In this section, we extend the same approach to the CIFAR-
10 data set (Krizhevsky, 2009). To better contextualize
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
(f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Figure 7. Generating CIFAR-10 examples with a full-precision
discriminative model trained with 20 iterations of PGD (Madry
et al., 2018) with  = 0.3, and 0.05 L2 weight decay on first
and last layers. Gradient ascent performed on a noisy image for
100 iterations with a step size of 1e-2. Predictions are made with
28.6%–53.6% [(e) and (c)] confidence.
Figure 8. A visualization of all sixty-four (nf = 64) 8×8 convolu-
tion filters from the first layer of our three-layer convolutional net-
work trained on CIFAR-10 with 20 steps of PGD up to max = 0.3
with an L∞ norm. A regularization constant of 0.05 was used with
L2 weight decay. The model maintains 72% of its 56% clean test
set accuracy when attacked with an L∞–max = 8/255 ≈ 0.031
constrained PGD adversary for 50 attack steps.
the images in Figure 7, compare with the equivalent noisy
images that were classified with 100% confidence by “state-
of-the-art” models from Madry et al. (2018) in Figure 3.
It is interesting to observe that the L2 weight decay used
with the model visualised in Figure 8 does not have the ef-
fect one might naively assume: to suppress the magnitude of
the average element across all kernels, more or less equally.
Instead, the weight decay objective is realized by dropping
the majority of filters entirely (≈ 72%), and focusing on
primitive concepts. A dedicated filter for each of the pri-
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Table 3. Single crop (224px) ResNet-18 error rates vs. FGSM per-
turbation amount for ImageNet misclassification attack for various
settings of precision for weights (W), activations (A), and gradients
(G). Attacks used 32-bit gradients to minimize gradient masking,
regardless of the gradient precision used during training. ResNets
were only trained for 76 epochs rather than the full 110 in Zhou
et al. (2016) to reduce overfitting.
W,A,G Error Clean eps=2 eps=4 eps=8
32,32,32 Top-1 38.8% 97.9% 98.8% 98.8%Top-5 16.2% 83.5% 88.7% 90.7%
3,3,32 Top-1 40.7% 97.8% 98.8% 98.9%Top-5 17.3% 83.1% 88.7% 90.7%
3,3,8 Top-1 40.2% 97.8% 98.7% 98.8%Top-5 17.2% 83.5% 89.0% 90.8%
3,3,6 Top-1 40.5% 97.6% 98.7% 98.7%Top-5 17.2% 82.8% 88.5% 90.7%
2,2,32 Top-1 45.4% 97.4% 98.5% 98.9%Top-5 20.4% 83.3% 88.9% 91.2%
2,2,6 Top-1 44.9% 97.5% 98.8% 98.9%Top-5 20.4% 83.3% 89.3% 91.3%
1,2,32 Top-1 50.4% 97.9% 98.8% 99.1%Top-5 24.8% 86.9% 91.8% 93.8%
1,2,8 Top-1 51.1% 97.8% 98.7% 98.8%Top-5 25.6% 86.7% 91.5% 93.1%
1,2,6 Top-1 50.2% 97.9% 98.9% 98.9%Top-5 24.8% 86.8% 91.8% 93.4%
1,1,32 Top-1 59.6% 96.8% 98.4% 98.9%Top-5 33.5% 86.4% 92.1% 94.2%
1,1,8 Top-1 59.6% 96.9% 98.5% 98.7%Top-5 33.5% 86.4% 92.0% 93.7%
mary colours (R, G, B) is learned, along with some vertical,
diagonal, and horizontal edge detectors. We suspect this is
a near-optimal strategy for a model of this architecture and
capacity as these features clearly generalize to a broad class
of naturally occurring images, while minimizing sensitivity
along directions of low variance in the data. This is reflected
by the excellent robustness of the model under a very strong
PGD attack, and it retains a significantly higher percentage
of its natural test accuracy than the state-of-the-art models
defended with PGD. This model achieves just 5.6% un-
der the state-of-the-art robustness of 45.8% for CIFAR-10
for the same PGD attack set on the WideResNet (W32–10)
of Madry et al. (2018), despite having 31.7% less clean test
accuracy and only 1.5% as many parameters. These results
concur with overwhelming evidence that modern deep neu-
ral networks are over-parameterized, e.g see (Rosenfeld &
Tsotsos, 2018).
6.3. ImageNet Classification
The data in Table 3 could be interpreted in one of two ways,
either that ResNets are fragile to precision reduction, or that
they are prone to overfitting since their improvements on
the natural test set consistently disappear compared to low-
precision variants when attacking with various perturbation
sizes. The latter argument implies that the incremental
accuracy improvement of the full-precision model on the
test set does not generalize. We also found that retraining
the WideResNet from Madry et al. (2018) with one or two
more orders of magnitude L2 weight decay, but less than
used with our vanilla CNN, fails to yield more than 30%
test accuracy with otherwise identical hyper-parameters.
Although the error rates in Table 3 are high, none of the
models were trained with data augmentation and no other
defense for ImageNet currently exists that does much better
than what we show here. The defense of Xie et al. (2018)
consisting of a randomization input layer was found to
achieve 0% accuracy by Athalye et al. (2018) for the same
threat model (L∞ and  = 8), although we acknowledge
that a stronger iterative attack was used in that case. We sug-
gest that starting with smaller models that can handle strong
weight decay or precision reduction is worth exploring as a
natural defense.
7. Discussion
It is important that we move away from data augmentation-
based techniques for conferring robustness. In addition to
slowing down training by a factor equal to the number of
steps of gradient ascent per weight update, these techniques
have significant limitations. Models defended this way are
vulnerable to perturbations just a small distance beyond that
used during training, which can be observed in Figure 2
of the (Madry et al., 2018) paper. As illustrated by Tanay
& Griffin (2016), a prerequisite for generating high quality
adversarial examples during training is a well regularized
model, otherwise, the examples will lie extremely close to
the decision boundary and sub-manifolds. As we showed,
an attacker is likely to be able to find a different attack that
works well on a model defended with a particular variant
of adversarial training. Conversely, there is no reason to ex-
pect properly regularized models to suffer from these same
limitations, as they fundamentally alter the geometry of the
decision boundary, and maximize entropy in the unexplored
representation space.
8. Conclusion
We have shown that small, regularized models, retain a high
percentage of their natural test accuracy against adversar-
ial examples. A promising direction for future research in
robust machine learning, without relying on data augmenta-
tion, is to start small. Once it can be shown that meaningful
features are learned, e.g., by testing that whatever little accu-
racy that is obtained does not degrade with local adversarial
and global non-examples, then progressively add capacity in
an iterative loop until satisfactory performance is reached.
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